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Freedom  and  moral  responsibility  in  Proclus,  Tria  opuscula  
Jan  Opsomer  (Leuven)  
  
1.  Soul  powers  
Theol.  Plat.  III  22.12-­‐‑24.24:  
[ὄντα]   A.  οὐσίία  
   B.  ζωήή  
   C.  νοῦς  
   D.  ψυχήή  
  
[γιγνόόµμενα]   1.  αἰ  λογικαὶ  ψυχαὶ  (λογικὰ  ζῷα)    
[downwards  to  humans]   participate  in  A,  B,  C  and  D  
   2.  αἰ  γνωστικαὶ  δυνάάµμεις  τοῦ  ἀλόόγου    
[down  to  (irrational)  animals]   participate  in  A,  B  and  C  
   3.  αἰ  ὀρεκτικαὶ  δυνάάµμεις  τῆς  γνωστικῆς  ἀµμέέτοχοι  δυνάάµμεως  
[down  to  plants]   participate  in  A  and  B  
   4.  ποιόότητες  καὶ  τὰ  πάάθη  πάάντα  καὶ  τῶν  σωµμάάτων  τὰ  ἔσχατα    
[down  to  bodies]   participate  in  A  
Philoponos  In  de  Anima  1.6-­‐‑9.2  (=  Ammonius,  apo  phônês):  
Δυνάάµμεις   γνωστικαίί   ζωτικαὶ  καὶ  ὀρεκτικαίί  






ἄλογοι   1.  φαντασίία  (ἔνδον)  [παθητικὸς  
νοῦς]  




(παρὰ   δὲ   ταύύτας)   αἰ  
φυτικαίί  
  
   1.  θρεπτικήή  
2.  αὐξητικήή  
3.  γεννητικήή  
Reconstruction  of  Proclus’  views:  
Δυνάάµμεις   γνωστικαίί   ζωτικαὶ  καὶ  ὀρεκτικαίί  
λογικαίί   ἡ  νοητικήή  
[διάάνοια]    
ἡ  δοξαστικήήv  
ἡ  άάναγωγὸς  ὄρεξις  
  
ἡ  γενησιουργὸς  ὄρεξις  
ἄλογοι   ἡ  µμνηµμονευτικήή    








φυτικαίί      θρεπτικήή  
αὐξητικήή  
[γεννητικήή]  =  ἡ  άάνανεάάζουσα?  
  
2.  De  malorum  subsistentia  
T1  Mal.  33:  “And  because  of  their  weakness  such  souls  suffer  what  they  ought  to  suffer  
when  they  have  chosen  badly.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  souls  are  drawn  by  matter  —  that  
is,   if  we  attribute  the  cause  of  their  generation  to  the  attraction  matter  exercises  upon  
souls,  as  something  that  draws  them  —  where  is  their  self-­‐‑motion  and  ability  to  choose  
(23:  ubi  est  le  automobile  et  anime  electiones  /  ποῦ  ἐστι  τὸ  αὐτοκίίνητον  καὶ  αἱ  τῆς  ψυχῆς  
αἱρέέσεις)?  Or  how  can  one  explain  why  among  the  souls  that  are  generated  in  matter,  
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some  gaze  at   intellect  and  the  good,  whereas  others  gaze  at  generation  and  matter,   if  
matter   draws   all   of   them   alike   to   itself,   troubling   them   and   doing   violence   to   them  
even  when  they  are  in  the  upper  regions?”  
T2  Mal.  58.16-­‐‑22:  “After  all,  saying  that  god  is  the  cause  of  all  things  is  not  the  same  as  
saying  that  he  is  the  only  cause  of  all  things.  The  former  statement  is  correct,  the  latter  
is  not.  For  intellect,  too,  is  the  cause  of  all  things  that  are  posterior  to  it,  and  soul  of  the  
things  that  follow  it,  and  nature  of  bodies  and  all  things  pertaining  to  bodies.  Each  of  
these   produces   in   a   different   way,   the   one   primordially   and   unitarily,   the   other  
eternally,  the  next  by  self-­‐‑movement  and  the  last  through  necessity.”  
T3  Mal.   61.20-­‐‑23:   “For   the   knowledge   of   the   soul   is   self-­‐‑moving,   that   of   intellect   is  
eternal,  and  that  of  the  gods  is  ineffable  and  unitary,”  
T4   Cf.   in   Remp.   2.275.8-­‐‑19:   ἀλλ'ʹ   ὅπου   µμὲν   τὸ   ἀναγκαῖον   καθ'ʹ   ὕπαρξίίν   ἐστιν  
ἀναγκαῖον,  ὡς  ἐπὶ  τῶν  κρειττόόνων  ἡµμῶν  ἀεὶ  ὡσαύύτως  καθ'ʹ  ἕνα  λόόγον  ζώώντων  καὶ  
τάάξιν  µμίίαν,  ὅπου  δὲ  κατὰ  ἀκολουθίίαν,  ὡς  ἐφ'ʹ  ἡµμῶν·∙  τὸ  γὰρ  ἐφ'ʹ  ἡµμῖν  ἄστατον  ὂν  ἔχει  
κατὰ  τὸ  ἀκόόλουθον  ἀνάάγκην,  εἰ  µμὲν  τάάδε  ἑλοίίµμεθα,  ταδὶ  πάάντως  ἀκολουθήήσειν,  εἰ  
δὲ  τάάδε,  ταδίί.  καθάάπερ  καὶ  ἐνταῦθα·∙  τόόνδε  γὰρ  ἑλόόµμενοι  τὸν  βίίον  συνεσόόµμεθα  αὐτῷ  
ἐξ   ἀνάάγκης·∙   ἁπλῶς   δὲ   οὐκ   ἐξ   ἀνάάγκης·∙   ἐνεδέέχετο   γὰρ   καὶ   ἄλλον   βίίον   ζῆν,   ἀλλὰ  
πρὸ   τῆς   αἱρέέσεως,   µμετὰ   δὲ   τὴν   αἵρεσιν   ἀδύύνατον.   καὶ   οὕτως   ἔοικεν   καὶ   πᾶν   τὸ  
ἐνδεχόόµμενον   εἰς   ἀναγκαίίαν   µμεταπίίπτειν   δύύναµμιν   διὰ   τῆς   ἀκολουθίίας,   καὶ   τῶν  
ἐνδεχοµμέένων  ἀναγκαίίως  ἐνδεχοµμέένοις  ἄλλοις  ἑποµμέένων.  
3.  On  Providence  
3.1.  Theodorus’  concept  of  ‘what  is  up  to  us’  
T5  Prov.  56:  “Next  you  ask  what  is  this  faculty  that  depends  on  us  (quid  le  in  nobis),  –  a  
question   you   had   better   put   at   the   beginning   of   your   arguments,   and   then   raised  
problems   about   it.   After   investigation   you   define   it   as   that   which   is   by   nothing  
dominated  or  mastered,   but   is,   as   you   literally   say,   self-­‐‑determined   (autoperigraptum)  
and   self-­‐‑activated   (autenergitum).   But   if   it   is   of   such   a   nature,   it   is   also   absolutely  
incorruptible  and  supremely  powerful  and  it  belongs  only  to  the  first  lord  of  all  beings,  
whereas  what  depends  on  us  is  no  longer  a  characteristic  of  us.”  
The  concept  of  τὸ  ἐφ’  ἡµμῖν.  It  is  
1. that  which  is  not  dominated  or  mastered    
2. αὐτοπερίίγραπτον    
3. αὐτενέέργητον  
The  inference  from  his  definition.  It  is  
a. absolutely  incorruptible  
b. supremely  powerful  
c. hence   it   can   only   be   attributed   to   the   first   god   (no   longer   to   ‘us’),   ‘up   to  
him’.  
Cf.  T6  Resp.  X,  617e3:  ἀρετὴ  δὲ  ἀδέέσποτον  (myth  of  Er).  Procl.  in  Remp.  2.13.7-­‐‑8:  δοκεῖ  γὰρ  
µμάάχεσθαι  τὸ  εἱµμαρµμέένον  πρὸς  τὸ  ἀδέέσποτον.  
T7  in  Remp.  2.276.3-­‐‑7:  ἡµμεῖς  δὲ  φήήσοµμεν  ἀδέέσποτον  µμὲν  εἶναι  καὶ  τὴν  κακίίαν,  ἀλλ'ʹ  ὡς  ἐφ'ʹ  
ἡµμῖν  οὖσαν  µμόόνον·∙  ἀδέέσποτον  δὲ  τὴν  ἀρετήήν,  ἀλλ'ʹ  οὐ  διὰ  τὸ  ἐφ'ʹ  ἡµμῖν  µμόόνον,  ἀλλὰ  διόότι  
τὴν   ψυχὴν   ἐλευθέέραν   ἀποτελεῖ   τῶν   πικροτάάτων   δεσποτῶν,   οἷς   ἡ   δουλεύύουσα   τῶν  
ἀγαθῶν  στέέρεται  πάάντων.  
T8   Phaedr.   245c5-­‐‑9:   Ψυχὴ   πᾶσα   ἀθάάνατος.   τὸ   γὰρ   ἀεικίίνητον   ἀθάάνατον·∙   τὸ   δ'ʹ   ἄλλο  
κινοῦν  καὶ  ὑπ'ʹ  ἄλλου  κινούύµμενον,  παῦλαν  ἔχον  κινήήσεως,  παῦλαν  ἔχει  ζωῆς.  µμόόνον  δὴ  
τὸ   αὑτὸ   κινοῦν,   ἅτε   οὐκ   ἀπολεῖπον   ἑαυτόό,   οὔποτε   λήήγει   κινούύµμενον,   ἀλλὰ   καὶ   τοῖς  
ἄλλοις  ὅσα  κινεῖται  τοῦτο  πηγὴ  καὶ  ἀρχὴ  κινήήσεως.  
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T9  Prov.  56  (cont.):  “This  definition  is  far  from  the  concept  of  ‘what  depends  on  us’  that  
the  ancient  philosophers  had  in  mind  when  they  assigned  this  faculty  to  human  souls.  
That  is  my  thesis,  but  it  is  up  to  you  to  check  whether  what  I  say  is  true.”  
Proclus’  argument  (§  56-­‐‑57):  
• The  ancients  distinguish  between  choice   (προαίίρεσις)  and  will   (βούύλησις)  
[in  58  he  will  identify  choice  and  τὸ  ἐφ’  ἡµμῖν]  
• Will  is  only  toward  the  good.  
• Choice  is  „open  to  both“  (the  good  and  the  bad),  and  hence  appropriate  to  
the  nature  of  soul.  
• The  corresponding  faculty  of  the  soul  is  called  ‘the  elective’  (hanc  potentiam  
ipsius  electivam  vocaverunt  /  προαιρετικὴν,  Strobel)  
• Choice  is  a  rational  appetitive  faculty  
• Choice  is  not  directed  at  the  good  alone  nor  to  the  apparent  good  alone,  but  
to  both:  to  the  good  and  to  the  apparent  good  (which  is  in  fact  bad)  
T10  §  58:  “To  sum  up,  choice  is  a  rational  appetitive  faculty  that  strives  for  some  good,  
either  true  or  apparent,  and  leads  the  soul  towards  both.  Through  this  faculty  the  soul  
ascends  and  descends,  does  wrong  and  does  right.”  
T11  §  59:  “Hence   the  elective   faculty  and   ‘what  depends  on  us’   seem   to  be   identical.  
Due  to  this  faculty  we  differ  both  from  divine  and  from  mortal  beings,  since  neither  of  
them  is  subject  to  this  ambivalent  inclination:  divine  beings,  because  of  their  excellence,  
are  established  only  among  true  goods,  and  mortal  beings,  because  of  their  deficiency,  
only   among   apparent   goods.   The   intellect   characterises   the   former,   sense   perception  
the  latter;  and  ‘the  intellect  is  our  king,  sense  perception  our  messenger’.”  
(§  60)  
• “We  are  dominated  by  universal  causes  and  receive  what  we  deserve.”  
• “Therefore  ‘what  is  up  to  us’  does  not  consist  in  the  power  and  license  to  do  
all  things.”  
• The  divine  power  is  unitary,  that  of  the  soul  dual  (ambivalent).  
• A  willed  life  (volita  vita)  is  in  accordance  with  the  good  and  godlike.  
T12  §  61:  “It   is  not  by  limiting  its  power  within  the  domain  of  desirable  things  inside  
the  souls,  that  you  have  made  the  elective  soul  such  as  it  is,  but  by  giving  it  the  power  
also  over  what  does  not  depend  on  us.  For  what  is  outside  the  soul  does  not  depend  on  
us.  Therefore,  our  life  is  a  mixture  of  what  does  not  depend  on  us  and  what  depends  
on  us.”  
Chs.  62-­‐‑5:  divine  providence  does  not  exclude  human  freedom.    
T13  Prov.  65:  “Therefore,  it  is  not  true  that,  if  the  gods  know  the  future,  its  outcome  is  
by   necessity   fixed,   but   one   should   attribute   to   the   future   an   undetermined   outcome  
from  what   is   determined,   and   to   the   gods   a   determinate   foreknowledge   of   what   is  
undetermined.”  
Rivalling  views:  
• Everything  is  necessitated  (Stoics)  
• God  does  not  know  everything  in  a  determinate  manner  (Peripatetics)  
T14   Prov.   65:   “We   conclude:   the   gods   know   what   depends   on   us   in   a   divine   and  
timeless  manner  and  yet  we  act  according  to  our  nature.  And  whatever  we  choose   is  
foreknown  by  them,  not  because  of  a  determination  in  us,  but  of  one  in  them.”  
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3.2.  Theodorus’  challenge  
§  2:  
• The  demiurge  of  the  world  is  immanent.  
• Demiurge  =  fate  ≈  providence  
• Fate  is  the  connection  and  ordered  sequence  of  events.  
• All  events  are  directed  with  inescapable  necessity.  
• Only  fate/providence  is  αὐτεξούύσιος  (self-­‐‑determining)  
• The  self-­‐‑determination  traditionally  ascribed  to  humans  is  not  real.  
• The  soul  and  its  decisions  are  mere  parts  in  the  concatenation  of  events.  
• The  concatenation  is  mechanic,  the  universe  is  one  big  machine.  
• [cf.   §   3:   fate   is   the   connected   sequence,   providence   the   necessity   causing   this  
sequence]  
T15   “[…]  you   supposed   that   this   dramaturgy   is   directed   merely   by   some   kind   of  
unalterable   necessity;   and   the   latter   you   celebrate   as   providence,   considering   it   the  
only  self-­‐‑determining  power  (autexousion)  and  mistress  of  all  things,  whereas  the  self-­‐‑
determination  of  the  human  soul,  about  which  there  is  so  much  talk,  is  in  your  opinion  
only   a   name   and   nothing   in   reality.   For   the   soul   is   situated   in   the   world   and  
subservient  to  the  actions  of  other  things  and  is  a  part  of  the  functioning  of  the  cosmos.  
Rather,  to  use  your  own  words,  the  inescapable  cause,  which  moves  all  things  that  this  
cosmos   ‘comprehends   within   itself’   (Tim.   30c8),   is   ‘mechanic’   (mechanica   facientem  /  
µμηχανοποιόόν,  Strobel),  and  the  universe  is,  as  it  were,  one  machine  (mechanemate  autem  
uno   quasi   ente   universo  /   µμηχανήήµματος   δὲ   ἑνὸς   ὡς   ὄντος   τοῦ   παντόός),   wherein   the  
celestial   spheres   are   analogous   to   the   interlocking   wheels   (tympanis   implicatis  /  
ἐµμπεπλεγµμέένοις  τυµμπάάνοις)  and  the  particular  beings,  the  animals  and  the  souls,  are  
like   the   things   moved   by   the   wheels,   and   everything   depends   upon   one   moving  
principle.”  
3.3.  Proclus’  reply.  Preliminary  distinctions,  based  on  common  notions  
1. providence  ≠  fate;  providence  precedes  fate  
2. the   rational   soul   ≠   the   irrational   soul;   the   first   is   seperable   from   body,   the  
second  is  not.  
3. knowledge  ≠  truth  
T16   §   4:   The   rational   soul   has   self-­‐‑determination   (τὸ   αὐτεξούύσιον)   and   that   which  
depends  on  us  (τὸ  ἐφ’  ἡµμῖν),  body  and  the  irrational  soul  are  subjected  to  necessity,  i.e.  
to  fate.    
These  two  souls  are  interwoven.  As  a  result,  the  irrational  life  participates  in  a  
‚likeness  of  choice’  (µμετέέχει  τινὸς  εἰδώώλου  τῆς  προαιρήήσεως),  the  rational  soul  
dims  self-­‐‑determination  under  the  influence  of  the  irrational.    
T17  §  9:  “As  there  are  beings  that  are  eternal  in  both  respects  [se.  in  substance  and  in  
activities]   and   beings   that   need   time   in   both   respects,   there   must   also   be   some  
intermediary   realm   […].   The   only   remaining   possibility   is   to  make   the   intermediary  
eternal  in  substance,  temporal  in  activity.  Thus,  we  have  pointed  out  to  you  the  three  
orders  of  beings,  which  we  call  intellectual,  psychic,  and  corporeal.”  
T18   §   10:   “According,   then,   to   our   common   notion   of   ‘fate,   events   that   are   ordered  
under   fate  are   those   that  are   interconnected;  and  according   to   the  generally  accepted  
understanding  of  ‘connection’,  interconnected  things  are  divided,  dissociated  either  in  
place   or   time,   though   capable   of   being   connected   by   another   cause.   Such   things   are  
moved  by  another  and  are   corporeal.   For   things   existing  outside  of  bodies  are   either  
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superior  to  both  place  and  time  [sc.  intellect]  or,  if  they  have  activities  in  time,  seem  at  
least  not  to  occupy  space  [sc.  soul].  From  all  these  premises  the  conclusion  is  evident:  
things  governed  and  connected  by  fate  must  be  things  moved  by  an  external  cause  and  
totally  corporeal.”  
Definition  of  ‘fate’,  T19  §  12:  “Thus  we  have  discovered  the  meaning  of  fate  and  how  it  
is  the  nature  of  this  world,  an  incorporeal  substance,  as  the  patron  of  bodies,  and  life  as  
well   as   substance,   since   it   moves   bodies   from   the   inside   and   not   from   the   outside,  
moving  everything  according  to  time  and  connecting  the  movements  of  all  things  that  
are  dissociated   in   time  and  place.  According   to   fate  mortal  beings  are  also  connected  
with  eternal  beings  and  are   set   in   rotation   together  with   them,  and  all   are   in  mutual  
sympathy.  Also  nature  in  us  binds  together  all  the  parts  of  our  body  and  connects  their  
interaction,  and  this  nature  can  also  be  viewed  as  a  kind  of  'ʹfate'ʹ  of  our  body.”  
T20  §   13:   “There   is   no   choice   in   bodies.  Hence  you  might   say   that  necessity   and   the  
absence  of  choice  is  a  characteristic  of  bodies,  but  not  something  better  than  bodies.  For  
even   what   moves   in   a   circle,   moves   of   necessity   in   this   way,   since   it   has   a   nature  
capable  of  a  circular  movement,  just  as  fire  moves  to  the  circumference  and  earth  to  the  
centre.  Thus  Plato  set  necessity  to  preside  over  the  coming  to  be  of  bodies,  and  hence  
also  over  their  passing  away.”  
T21  §  15:  “Therefore,  the  soul  that  can  act  separately  from  the  body  must  also  have  an  
existence  separable  from  the  body.”  
• Affections   (epithymia   and   thymos)   and   perceptions   have   their   natural   activity  
together  with  the  body  (§  16)  
• The   rational   soul   can   free   itself   from   the   irrational:   “In   all   such   activities,   the  
rational   soul   shows   that   it   disdains   all   irrational  motions,   both   cognitive   and  
appetitive,  and  liberates  itself  from  them  as  though  they  were  alien.  […]  Hence,  
it  is  clear  that  the  soul  acting  in  that  way  manifestly  dissociates  itself  from  sense  
perceptions,   which   it   condemns,   and   from   the   pleasure   and   pain,   which   it  
eliminates.”  (§  17)  
Cf.  T22  §  44:   “[T]he  other  kind  of   life  must  be   intellectual  according   to   its  nature  
and  it  cannot  bear  to  follow  the  violent  affections  of  sense  perception.  It  contains  in  
itself  the  criteria  for  discerning  deceitful  motions  from  outside;  it  adds  that  which  is  
lacking   in   that  which   sense  perception   experiences   and   refutes  what   is   untrue   in  
them,   and   it   does   all   this   from  within.   For  perception   cannot   be   judged  with   the  
data   of   perception,   but   only  with   intellectual   reasons,   which   sense   perception   is  
unable  to  receive.  In  fact,  the  intellectual  life  must  be  opposed  to  sense  perception,  
as   it   is   immaterial,   separate  and  self-­‐‑activating   (immaterialem  et  separabilem  et  ex  se  
operativum  /   ἄϋλον   καὶ   χωριστὴν   καὶ   αὐτοενέέργητον).   To   this   life   we   must  
attribute  choice,  which  may  tend  to  both  sides,  upwards  and  downwards”  
Lives   of   the   soul,   T23   §   20:   “[…]   when   the   soul   acts   according   to   its   nature,   it   is  
superior   to   the   condition  of   being   led  by   fate;   but  when   it   is   brought  down   to   sense  
perception   and   made   irrational   and   corporeal,   it   goes   along   with   the   things   below,  
lives  together  with  them  as  with  some  drunken  neighbours,  and  it  is  dominated  by  the  
cause  that  reigns  over  them.  For  there  must  exist  also  such  a  class  of  beings  that  are  in  
their  substance  above  fate,  but  are  sometimes  placed  under  fate  through  relation.”    
Virtue  is  free,  T24  §  23:  “For  virtue  alone  is  free  and  ‘without  a  master’  and  ‘fitting  for  a  
free  man’,  truly  the  power  of  the  soul,  and  he  who  possesses  it  is  a  master.”  
T25  §  24:  “Every  soul,  then,  has  a  share  in  the  state  of  freedom  insofar  as  it  has  a  share  
of  virtue.  And  insofar  as  it  has  a  share  of  vice  and  weakness,  it  also  has  a  share  in  the  
state   of   being   enslaved   to   others,   and   not   only   to   fate,   but,   so   to   speak,   to   all   those  
   6  
factors  that  are  capable  of  giving  the  object  of  their  desire  to  those  who  want  it,  or  are  
capable  of  taking  it  away.”  
T26  §  25:  “Further,  if  the  intellect  and  god  are  prior  to  the  soul  and  after  the  soul  come  
affections  and  bodies,  and  if  it  is  a  property  of  the  latter  to  act  in  a  necessitated  manner  
and  of  the  intellect  and  god  to  act  in  a  manner  superior  to  all  necessity  and  to  be  solely  
free,  then  the  soul  [will  be  in  different  states  depending  upon]  whether  it  sides  with  the  
latter  or  the  former:  it  will  either  take  on  the  necessity  of  inferior  things  or  put  forward  
the  freedom  of  the  superior,  and  it  will  be  subservient,  either  ruled  from  above  or  from  
below,   and,   while   a   slave,   will   either   reign   together   with   its   masters   or   be   a   slave  
together  with  those  who  are  only  slaves.”    
T27  §  26:  “When,  then,  you  want  to  see  what  depends  on  us,  look  at  the  soul  that  lives  
in  accordance  with  nature.  The  soul  that  lives  in  accordance  with  nature  is  that  which  
is  not  infirm.”  
3.4.  Proclus’  reply  to  concrete  objections  
Causes  for  the  events  that  result  from  our  actions  at  different  levels:  
1. The  god  from  whom  comes  the  good  for  all.  
2. The  periodic  revolution  of  the  world,  the  governance  of  the  world.  
3. Humans  
T28   §   34:   “They   [sc.   truly   wise   people]   consider   themselves   to   be   a   third   cause  
whenever   they   obtain   something   after   making   choices   and   contribute   by   their   own  
impulses  to  the  accomplishment  of  what  is  to  be  done.  But  whenever  something  occurs  
contrary   to   their   choice,   only   then   do   they   rightly   impute   the   responsibility   to   the  
whole  and  to  its  action  as  being  overwhelming.  This  is  because  particular  things  must  
everywhere   act   together   with   the   whole,   whereas   the   whole   can   act   both   with   and  
without   the   particulars.   […]   Therefore,   even   if   we   succeed,   we   must   attribute  
responsibility   to   the  decisive  moment  of   fate  and   to  god,   in  order   that  what  happens  
may  have   three   causes.  The   first   is   that  which  makes   it   good,   the   second   that  which  
makes  it  fixed  into  a  single  conformity  with  the  universe,  the  third  is  the  purely  human  
factor.  For  every  human  deed  is  a  part  of  the  universe,  but  not  vice  versa.”  
T29   §   35:   “Where,   then,   must   we   situate   in   this   context   that   which   depends   on   us,  
when  what  happens  is  connected  with  the  periodic  revolution  of  the  world,  or  again,  
when  it  comes  about  due  to  that  cause  alone?  Where  else,  then,  shall  we  say,  but  in  our  
own   interior   choices   and   impulses?  We  ourselves  are  masters  only  of   these,  whereas  
we   share   control   over   external   events   with   many   other   causes,   which   are   more  
powerful.  This  is  because  what  happens  outside  ourselves  must  take  place  as  a  part  of  
the   universe   in   order   for   it   to   happen   at   all.   It   happens   when   the   universe   joins   in  
assenting  to  it  and  collaborates  with  it,  so  that  the  universe  may  act  upon  itself,  acting  
with  a  part  of  itself  on  another  and  undergoing  influence  from  another  part.”  
Cf.  T30  §  55:  “Did  we  not  agree  that  what  depends  on  us   is  not  a   force  ruling  
over   external   events,   but   only   collaborating  with   them?   If   so,   it   is   reasonable  
that  it  arranges  what  is  internal  according  to  its  power,  but  not  what  is  external,  
since  it  also  needs  other  factors  not  within  its  power  to  dispose  those  things.  I  
myself,  when   I   consider   these   problems,   have   great   admiration   for   the   noble  
Epictetus  who  often  exhorts  us  not   to  confuse  what  depends  on  us  with  what  
does  not  depend  on  us,  and  not  to  be  in  such  a  state  with  regard  to  things  that  
do  not  depend  on  us  so  as  to  believe  they  ought  absolutely  to  occur.”  
T31  §  35:  “And  however  we  may  qualify  the  events  that  take  place,  we  do  not  say  that  
the  universe   has   this   [moral]   character,   but   the  person  who   acts.   This   is   because   the  
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[moral]  quality  in  what  happens  did  not  come  from  the  world,  but  from  the  life  of  the  
acting  person.”  
T32  §  36:  “However,  the  faculty  that  depends  on  us  is  not  only  a  capacity  for  acting  but  
also   a   capacity   of   choice,   choosing   to   act   <either>   on   it   self   or   together   with   other  
factors.   And   it   is   because   of   its   choice   that   we   say   that   it   makes   failures   and   acts  
rightly,  since  even  if  the  result  is  good,  but  the  agent  acts  on  the  basis  of  an  evil  choice,  
we  say  that  the  action  is  bad.  For,  what  is  good  in  what  is  done  is  due  to  a  [favourable]  
external  factor,  but  what  is  bad  is  due  to  the  choice  of  the  agent.  Thus  it  is  evident  to  all  
that  we  are  masters  of  our  actions  to  the  extent  that  they  are  deliberately  chosen.”  
⟶  The  argument  from  divination  
⟶  Misfortunes  of  good  people  
4.  Decem  dubitationes  circa  providentiam  
T33  §  35:  Dub.  39:  “Furthermore,  of  all   the   things  we  possess   some  we  have   through  
our   soul’s   capacity   for   self-­‐‑determination   (to   autexousion),   others   because   we   suffer  
from  other  people,  still  others  through  the  sole  agency  of  the  universe.  For  the  things  
then  of  which  we  ourselves  are  master  by  acting  on  our  own,  we  have  only  ourselves  
to  blame.   ‘For   the  responsibility’,  as  he   [Plato]  says,   ‘is  with   the  person  who  chooses’  
(Resp.   X,   617E4:   aitia   helomenou),   whether   it   is   illness   or   poverty   someone   owes   to  
himself.  Providence  is  not  to  be  blamed  (617E5:  theos  anaitios).  For  we  do  not  say  that  
providence,  which  has  brought  about  the  capacity  of  free  choice  rules  in  the  universe  
for  the  sake  of  the  abolishment  of  this  freedom,  but  as  preserving  its  coming  about.  As  
for   the   things   done   to   us   by   others,   though   we   may   unjustly   suffer,   [we   should  
consider   that]   the   law  of   the  universe   allows  parts   to   act   on   each  other   according   to  
their  own  inclinations.”  
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